

THE FUTURE OF PEACE BETWEEN ACEH AND JAKARTA UNDER HELSINKI AGREEMENT 2005

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Abstract

Purpose of the study: The paper examines the waves of criticism on the Indonesian government's violations in the implementation of the Helsinki agreement 2005 between Indonesia and the Aceh National Liberation Front (GAM). The question is, why the Aceh government which is controlled by GAM is retaining and loyal to the peace treaty when the Government of Indonesia has less attention. The objective of this research is to identify the latent interest in the post-conflict period.

Methodology: By the qualitative method, data from the Aceh region were collected by interviewing selected informants from stakeholders in parliament, bureaucrats, academicians, local parties' leaders, and ex-combatants.

Main Findings: The findings show that the existence of the idea of self-government in Aceh societies is still maintained, and peace agreement becomes a new document of struggle in a democratic system.

Applications of this study: This research is useful for those who involved in the peace agreement including the Conflict Management Initiative and the European Union who initiated the peace to find common ground on the issue of the implementation of all points in the agreement which has not been realized until now.

Novelty/Originality of this study: The research argues that Aceh government that dominated by GAM exponents, has efforts to defend the treaty as a legal-political instrument to reach the self-government's status with its main elements namely local parties, the Aceh Guardian institutions, and recognition of Aceh society with flag and hymn as continuity of ideological movement. It implicates the dynamic of relations between the center and the regional government.

Keywords: *Agreement, Ideology, Peace, Self-government, Violations.*

INTRODUCTION

The paper aims to portray the implementation of the peace agreement between Indonesia and the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front also known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and then explains the position of each party to deal with the criticisms. The armed conflict of Aceh, opposing the Government of The Republic of Indonesia arose since GAM was proclaimed on the 4th of December 1976 by Tengku Hasan Tiro ([Gani & Hamdani, 2009](#)). The armed political movement which took thousands of lives found peace with the signing of an agreement in Helsinki, Finland, between the Government of Indonesia and the representative of GAM on 15th Agustus 2005, after the great tsunami flood that decimated most of Aceh. In the peace agreement, which better known as Memorandum of Understanding Helsinki (MOU), both parties in dispute agreed to take a peaceful path to quickly conceive Aceh's aspirations as a prosperous and civilized nation. There are many points of the agreement approved upon to ensure the implementation of peace and developments for Aceh.

After the MOU signing, and on the course of its implementation, there are facts reflected from the official stances of local parties, Non-governmental organizations, and also domestic and foreign observers who stated that there are many points in the Helsinki MOU that are not or have not been implemented by the central government, either by not doing it at all or altering the arrangement in the MOU using the national constitution without the involvement of GAM representative. There are 9 fundamental points of MOU that have not realized ([Daily, 2020](#)). Martti Ahtisaari, the Conflict Management Initiative founder, who initiated and facilitated MOU Helsinki 2005, made a report in 2012 that there were 10 deviations of implementation of MOU to Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), 4 Unimplemented LoGA provisions that are based on the MoU, and 2 points MOU were not covered in LoGA ([Aceh, 2016](#)). At least 3 items in MOU were ignored by Jakarta, these were the establishment of the Human Rights Court, the Claim Settlement Commission, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). TRC is a key to open human rights abuses in Aceh when this region was classified as Area of Military Operations (Daerah Operasi Militer-DOM) in 1990-1998 when it was used to justify and escalate counterinsurgency operations against GAM, namely large-scale abuses of human rights including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, rape, detention of nonviolent activists and unjust trials of alleged GAM leaders and supporters ([Hamid, 2018](#)).

This situation is very contrary to Lambourne's theory of peacebuilding, which states that justice and reconciliation are important goals that must be present in successful post-conflict peacebuilding processes and mechanisms, especially after the genocide. This shows the importance of reconciliation as a means for conflict resolution and transformation (Lambourne, 2003). Furthermore, it is stated that a peace agreement that tolerates war criminals to share power with their victims, or people who have survived their violence, will be considered as 'unjust peace' and therefore harm stability and reconciliation.

The central government was also considered to disavow MOU when refused to ratify the *qanun* Aceh (Aceh local regulation) Number 9 of 2013 as a change to Qanun No. 8 of 2012 concerning Lembaga Wali Nanggroe or the Aceh Guardian institution. In this Qanun, mentioned in article 29, among other things, that Wali Nanggroe has the authority to govern assets and resources inside and outside of Aceh (overseas), collaborate with various parties both domestic and foreign for the progress of Aceh civilization, and maintain peace in Aceh and participate in resolving world peace. The central government strongly objected to those clauses and sent 21 points that must be revised by Aceh Parliament (DPRA) in the qanun. However, until the end of December 16, 2013, when Malik Mahmud's inauguration as Wali Nanggroe was carried out unilaterally by the DPRA along with the Governor of Aceh, the DPRA did not revise it and thus the central government had not ratified it (Mukti et al., 2019). Not only rejected the qanun, but the central government also refused to ratify Qanun Number 3 of 2013 regarding Aceh Coat of Arms and Flag. The Minister of Home Affairs reasoned that the symbols and flags were very similar to the flag of GAM in the armed upheaval, which contradicted the Government Regulation (PP) No. 77 of 2007 and the LoGA of 2006.

Furthermore, the central government also rejected Qanun Number 17 of 2013 on the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation initiated by the Aceh government (Serambi, 2014). The rejection of these 4 Acehese Qanuns made widespread disappointment among the former GAM activists both within the government of Aceh and those in the general public which have created tensions between the Central and the Aceh government. In this condition, according to Aspinall, Helsinki Agreement has been absorbed in Indonesia's rigid national system in a way that deviates from what was agreed upon in the MOU (Aspinall, 2005).

On the other party, compliance with the peace agreement in the MOU was shown by GAM ever since the beginning from when it signed up to the present. All clauses approved in the peace agreement were obeyed by GAM, namely comprehensive disarmament for GAM, the dissolution of resistance units or GAM soldiers, not raising the GAM flag in the midst of the community, banning GAM propaganda activities, including the establishment of local political parties that led by former GAM activists as instruments of democracy to run the government in Aceh (Kingsbury, 2016). Kingsbury also quoted that a series of agreements in MOU has not been realized by the Central Government include; establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the establishment of a Commission that deals with Human Rights violations in Aceh during the conflict, Authority for Aceh to control the sea and airports, and providing compensations to victims and affected people during the conflict period in an even and fair manner. The strength of Kingsbury's analysis as an advisor to the GAM negotiators lies in the existence of a 'warning' or 'alert' to new conflicts in Aceh. He stated that if the central government has no strong commitment to fulfilling all points in MOU, it will come up with a new conflict. Furthermore, Aspinall (2007) said that if the root of the conflict, namely identity construction, and institutionalization, is not managed properly, the conflict tends to be continued (Aspinall, 2007).

Related to the low commitment of the central government to fulfill all agreed points in the peace agreement, Jiwon (2015) and Kimura (2015) see this from other perspectives. The absence of realizations of MOU points from Jakarta was seen by Jiwon as 'preemptive policies', such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Human Rights Court for Aceh, until now, no institution has been established. Jiwon stated that the policies adopted by reluctant transitional leaders in the face of worse alternatives without the intention to fully implement the adopted policies (Jiwon, 2015). Preemptive policies can be interpreted as complicated policies from the Government of Indonesia to the people of Aceh as Kimura Ehito revealed that, Indonesian elites are systematically inhibited global norms about Human Rights to be carried out in this country (Ehito, 2015).

All researchers above didn't portray the recent phenomena of the strong commitment of GAM to maintain peace agreement in MOU as stated by GAM leader Malik Mahmud on the 43rd anniversary of GAM (Modusaceh, 2019), although the central government doesn't do the same efforts.

Exploring loyalty of Aceh government and GAM exponents to maintain peace, it can be found in Lee (2020) study, which stated that peace in Aceh premised on the transition from a wartime political order to a peacetime order, where The end of the Aceh conflict has brought about the perpetuation of the stranglehold of the wartime elites over the political economy of the province (Lee, 2020). It confirmed Aspinall's publications (2009) that GAM elites were absorbed and transformed in the local economy in terms of contractors and other illegal relations. Within a collection of well-established neo-patrimonial political and economic structures, they defined themselves as a predatory part (Aspinall, 2009).

Meanwhile, this research explores from a different point of view with bringing political ideology in terms of ethno-nationalism as political preferences from Segal and friends (1995), who pointed that the important role of ideology in political preferences (Segal et al., 1995). Through a qualitative approach, this research takes a position to explain a

fundamental question; why GAM who controls the Aceh government, continues to be loyal and to maintain the validity of the MOU even though the Indonesian government has denied it many times. And then, how former GAM activists carried out efforts in political movements when they had taken control of the Aceh government so that the results of the MOU could continue to be carried out in Aceh.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research develops its analysis using political preference theory from [Epstein and Mershon \(1996\)](#), which has been widely developed in the study of political decisions and policy choices in government, as well as to examine the preferences of judges in court in the United States. Theory of Political Preferences explains the behavior of the political elite in making choices of actions and decisions based on certain preferences. Both researchers also stated that a person's political preferences can be used to predict political behavior or decisions that will be taken in the future ([Epstein & Mershon, 1996](#)). The political preference is the tendency to prioritize a choice of political behaviour or decisions by referring to certain rationality made by the political elite ([Oskarsson, 2004](#)), to maximize results and minimize costs in achieving certain political goals. Governments, political parties, and politicians will make policies that are in line with their ideological lines and agenda.

In the research of [Segal and friends \(1995\)](#), one of the most influential political preferences of political elites is ideological preference ([Segal et al., 1995](#)). In the context of this case study in Aceh, the political preferences of political elites in Aceh can be referred to the political ideology they have been up to now, namely the ideology of GAM or Terrorism, in the form of the teachings of GAM founder Tengku Hasan Tiro ([Tiro, 1968](#)). GAM's ideology was conceptualized through Hasan Tiro's thought in formulating the history of Aceh into teaching that inspired his people in this modern era. the process of forming a political ideology that emerged from great leaders and then taught and accepted by the wider community like this is a norm in every revolutionary political movement ([Freedon, 2006](#)). Hasan Tiro's ideological thinking was very strong in organizing the identity, historical legacy, goals, and paths of liberation for the people of Aceh who felt oppressed and exploited by the Indonesian government during the Soekarno and Suharto administrations. Hasan Tiro's teaching or GAM's ideology, in Van Dijk (2006) words, organizes their personality, behavior, aims, expectations and values, and resources as well as their relations to other social groups as the basis of the self-image of a social group ([Dijk, 2006](#)).

The influence of the political ideology of the legacy of the period before peace or even in the longer period of a nation on the political preferences of regional governments dominated by local political parties who inherited the spirit of the revolutionary movement is common in the dynamics of local politics. This can be found in E.C Wolff's study (2018) of the Italian Casa Pound party (CPI) which was self-declared as 'fascist'. She explained the influence of the political ideology of the legacy of the past which was reflected in the policy choices made by the CPI party. The trends of continuity in Italian and European right-wing radicalism, showing that, amid intellectual disguise and political correctness, the legacy of a long-standing fascist tradition still dominates today's political discourse ([Wolff, 2018](#)).

Refer to [Hinich and Munger \(1994\)](#), this is the important role of ideology as political preferences in the Aceh case. Both researchers also stressed that ideological reasons can better explain the rational considerations of political actors in a political environment that is still colored by 'movements' because they will be able to calculate support and mass movements ([Hinich & Munger, 1994](#)). The atmosphere coloured by the 'political movement' is still very thick in Aceh which is clearly read through the statements of the political elite who still often utter utterances to 'demand independence' if their demands are not met, for example, related to the issue of flags or the realization of a peace agreement (Helsinki MOU 2005). From the studies of Segal and Hinich, the role of ideology, in this case, GAM political ideology, as a political preference of the political elite and the people of Aceh is still very strong after peace. Political parties are effective vehicles of political ideology because they can shape and offer policy choices that are based on ideological values ([Harrison & Boyd, 2018](#)).

Furthermore, this research also brings Honneth's recognition theory (1995), that is interpreted as the granting of a certain status, in social relations, or relations between groups of people, or countries, in relation to confrontations between groups of different nationalities and or ethnicity ([Honneth, 1996](#)). In Aceh's case, recognition will emerge respect and solidarity, and both are expressed in the peace agreement, so they can be traced in agreed points. Operationally, recognition in MOU is indicated by respect to the right of the socio-cultural identity of Aceh with the establishment of Wali Nanggroe institution, right of political freedom to establish local parties, and the right of economic opportunity with special allocation. From central government, solidarity aspects also can be identified in MOU such as compensation on victims in conflict era, amnesty, and land-allocations for all former GAM combatants.

METHODOLOGY

This qualitative research explores 2 aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM, namely, first, identification and verification of points that have not been implemented and even violated by both parties, and, second, identification of latent political motivations that continue parties, especially the motivations of political ideology that exist in GAM. The researcher collects data from field areas in Aceh by interviewing 53 informants from stakeholders in parliament, academicians, local parties' leaders, and ex-combatants. This technique is purposive in that selection of informants uses criteria as follow; (1) GAM activists in the Aceh

Government both in the local parliament (DPRA), local parties, and in the local government, and non-governmental organizations; (2) Ex-GAM Leaders who living in Aceh; (3) Ex-combatants GAM; (4) GAM activists and supporters abroad. Selected documents from the related sources, both in Aceh local government and other institutions, are collected and verified.

The data analysis technique used in this study refers to the technique of an interactive model of analysis, which rests on 3 components; data reduction, data presentation, and drawing and testing conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The Triangulation technique is used to check the validity of the data before being analysed further.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Crucial Points in Helsinki MOU

In negotiations towards the peace agreement, the Helsinki MOU, from 2002 until it was signed in 2005, there were indeed many crucial issues between the two parties and has the potential to foil the negotiations. Some of the crucial issues were raised by negotiating leaders from both GAM and the Indonesian Government, including Malik Mahmud as GAM Negotiator Chairperson, Nurdin Abdurrahman (GAM negotiator member), and Hamid Awaludin (Indonesian Negotiator Team Leader).

In his handwritten letter as an introduction to the book *Peace in Aceh: Notes on the Peace Process between the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh Freedom Movement (GAM) in Helsinki*, by Hamid Awaludin, Malik Mahmud said there were 3 crucial issues in the negotiations, that is (1) the establishment of local parties in Aceh; (2) Authority for Aceh to conduct trade relations directly with foreign countries as well as full control of the sea and air transportation administration by Aceh; and (3) the establishment of a Trustee institution for Aceh (Awaludin, 2008). GAM member Nurdin Abdurrahman and GAM advisor Damien Kingsbury proposed three main negotiating problems which they called the Three-Point program (TPU), consisting of (1) End of Hostilities program which is the creation of Aceh as a peace zone involving international forces as its guarantor; (2) Political Parties and Elections which is the establishment of local political parties and free elections; and (3) Formal Acceptance which is the Indonesian government creates a law on Aceh's self-governance (Ali et al., 2008). From the Indonesian delegates, there are some crucial issues made by Hamid Awaludin, that is (1) the issue of *Self Government/ Special Autonomy*; (2) the establishment of local political parties in Aceh; (3) Acehese symbols, hymns, and flags; (4) Amnesty issues and the release of previous GAM prisoners/negotiators (Awaludin, 2008). Those issues were subject to debate during the course of negotiations for 6 months from January 2005 to July 2005 in 5 rounds of negotiations. If the crucial issues are tabulated in 2 categories, specifically crucial issues according to the GAM delegation and the Indonesian delegation, then it will appear which issues are difficult to decide in negotiations, which shown below:

Table 1: Crucial Issues as Declared by GAM and RI Delegations in 2005 Helsinki Negotiations

No.	Crucial Issue	GAM Delegation	RI Delegation	Annotation
1	<i>Self Government/Special Autonomy</i>	V	V	The discussion almost deadlocked, with a middle ground agreement, " <i>Governing Aceh</i> "
2	Establishment of an International Peace Zone in Aceh	V	-	Rejected
3	Amnesty and release from captivity of the previously detained GAM negotiator	V	V	Approved after a long debate
4	Establishment of the Wali Nangroe Aceh Institution	V	-	Approved
5	Aceh's direct trade with foreign countries	V	-	Approved under RI control
6	Establishment of Local Political Parties in Aceh	V	V	Approved, Discussion almost deadlocked and become the last agenda
7	Coat of Arms, Hymn, and Flag of Aceh	V	V	Approved

Source: Compiled and processed by the author from Awaludin (2008), Ali (2008)

The issue of direct trade between Aceh and foreign parties, the establishment of the Wali Nangroe institution, and the Acehese emblem and flag were well-received by the Indonesian government delegation by approving without debate that disrupts the negotiations. Meanwhile, the issue of the formation of an international peace zone was rejected by the Indonesian delegation because it was considered as an effort to internationalise the Aceh problem (Awaludin, 2008). The

discussion of 3 other issues that are *self-governance* special autonomy, amnesty, and local parties in Aceh drained the energy of various parties involved, even almost deadlocked, with the last discussion going on the issue of local parties in the final round, July 2005.

Based on the Helsinki Agreement, the Indonesian Government then revised Law No. 18 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darusalam (NAD), becoming Law No. 11 of 2006 on the Government of Aceh (LoGA). In its legal considerations, the Government of Indonesia states that the enactment of the Law on Government of Aceh is, (1) that the government system of the Republic of Indonesia according to the 1945 Constitution recognizes and respects specific or special regional government units regulated by Law; (2) that based on the constitutional journey of the Republic of Indonesia, Aceh is a specific or special regional government unit related to one of the distinctive characteristics of the history of the struggle of the Acehnese who have high resilience and strong willpower; (3) that the resilience and strong willpower stemmed from an outlook on life based on Islamic law which gave birth to a strong Islamic culture so that Aceh became an area of capital for the struggle in seizing and defending the independence of the Republic of Indonesia; (4) that the administration of government and the implementation of development in Aceh have not been able to fully realize people's welfare, justice and growth promotion, fulfillment, and protection of human rights so that the Aceh Government needs to be developed and implemented based on the principles good governance; and (5) that the earthquake and tsunami disaster that occurred in Aceh have fostered the solidarity of the entire potential of the Indonesian people to rebuild the community and territory of Aceh and resolve conflicts in a peaceful, holistic, sustainable and dignified manner within the framework of the Republic of Indonesia ([Indonesian Law, 2006](#)).

To implement LoGA, a minimum of 4 government regulations are needed, and 6 presidential regulations and other rules must be prepared by the central government ([Bhakti, 2008](#)). In terms of the Aceh Government, implementing the LoGA requires forming regulations in the form of Qanun or Aceh local regulations with a minimum of 59 qanuns. The formation of the qanun has been continuously carried out until now, although it still cannot fulfill everything. According to Governor Zaini Abdullah, it was caused by the central government has also not completed the drafting of very basic government regulations, such as the regulation of oil and gas management, regulations regarding land management and administration in Aceh, as well as arrangements for air and seaport management in Aceh, as mandated in the 2005 Helsinki MOU.

GAM's Perspective on the Helsinki MOU

From the results of in-depth interviews with stakeholders, former GAM activists in Aceh and abroad, and former combatants at the grassroots level, there were several categories of their perceptions on MOU in 2005, first, from the GAM elites and former GAM activists, the Helsinki MOU is an optimal achievement whose meaning is none other than 'self-governing Aceh' and the term 'self-government' as a gradual decrease from GAM's initial demands of '*Aceh Merdeka*' (Free Aceh). The term they use to explain the concept of 'self-government' to GAM supporters is 'the nation of Aceh is independent in the Indonesian country'. The phrase is commonly used in local party meetings and in the Aceh governor campaigns in 2017. In the elite understanding of the Aceh Party, self-government is defined as Aceh which has its own government; Aceh has the right to have its own broad authority, flag, symbol, and song, and also use of their own emblem on various official documents such as marriage books, birth certificates, land certificates, including the gate to check passport documents like in Sabah, Malaysia ([Nurhasim, 2016](#)).

The second category emerged from grassroots who questioned the GAM elite on the fate of 'Aceh Merdeka' after MOU. Psychologically, GAM elites who for nearly 30 years indoctrinating the Acehnese with the ideals of Aceh independence, it was not easy to suddenly say that Aceh had not become independent because it had reconciled, so they said the Helsinki MOU was the first step towards Aceh Independence or 'Aceh Merdeka'. It means that Aceh after the Helsinki peace agreement was entering a period of transition to be independent. With this statement, GAM elites can invite the supporting community to maintain Aceh's peace. It can be understood that, if the GAM elite suddenly declares that Aceh has not become an independent state, then GAM supporters who have a low level of education will, in fact, consider their elite to have betrayed the Acehnese people, and that is very dangerous.

The third category is emerged from 'Aceh Merdeka' or free Aceh supporting groups and activists abroad, who stated that the Helsinki MOU had harmed the Acehnese because the negotiating elites had sold the ideals of 'Aceh Merdeka' with the concept of special autonomy, not even close to 'self-government.' They strongly opposed the results of the Helsinki agreement, especially after the birth of the LoGA of 2006 concerning the Government of Aceh which was considered by many to have unilaterally reduced many clauses in the MOU without agreement with the Acehnese. This group even accused that GAM negotiators had betrayed Hasan Tiro as Wali Nanggroe or The Aceh Guardian. They claimed that Hasan Tiro when he returned to Aceh, his understanding was that Aceh had become independent, so his anger exploded when he learned that Aceh was only a special autonomy region.

Various perspectives in observing Aceh's peace are certainly well understood by the elites in Aceh so that every step taken is to always consider minimizing risks that can divide the Acehnese. Local parties who are GAM elites are very careful in packing crucial issues in the MOU to gain support from the Acehnese people while maintaining a commitment to peace with the Republic of Indonesia.

On the other hand, Indonesian Government's perspective on the MOU which was represented by the attitude of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, as well as National Resilience Council, was none other than a peace agreement between Indonesia and GAM with the granting of special autonomy to Aceh. This specificity is reflected through the widest possible instrument of governance in Aceh, the establishment of local parties, the Wali Nanggroe institution, and economic compensation, as well as the enactment of Islamic law in Aceh. In specificity regarding the enactment of Islamic law in Aceh, GAM stated that it was a Jakarta's agenda and not a GAM negotiator initiative. From the basic attitude of the Indonesian government, it is clear that the Indonesian concept still applies, which has not provided space for the implementation of self-government in Aceh.

Local parties in their official stances openly criticized the central government's attitude in its commitment to implement and comply with the MOU, both in its 2006 LoGA derivatives and other regulation such as government regulations and presidential regulations that they saw as violations of Helsinki MOU. The typical attitude of local parties was that they differed in several issues within Aceh's internal government, but they had a solid attitude towards the central government in relation to the Helsinki MOU. Local parties and former GAM elites and activists see that the Helsinki MOU is an achievement that can deliver Aceh to self-government peacefully and democratically.

As an achievement, in the eyes of GAM activists, the Helsinki MOU has explicitly fulfilled the demands regarding the recognition of a distinctive Acehese cultural identity, which has led to a respect for the rights of Acehese people in terms of their political rights, economic and social rights as conceptualized by Honneth above. The MOU points which stated this can be found in the article about recognizing the Wali Nanggroe Aceh institution with all its cultural attributes, freedom to establish local political parties that are very typical of Aceh, and the distribution of greater tax returns for Aceh compared to the central government. While from the aspect of solidarity, the central government agreed to allocate special funds for the acceleration of Aceh's development from the national budget, as well as economic compensation for the families of the victims during the conflict, including guarantees about the holding of a Human Rights Court for violators in Aceh during the war ([MOU, 2005](#)), even though this is still hampered by the implementation.

All achievements in MOU's points, such as the establishment of Wali Nanggroe institution, Aceh flag, Aceh regional anthem, and local parties, are really as political ideology's expression as a legacy from Hasan Tiro's teaching. In detail, Hasan Tiro explored his political ideology in his monumental book, which he wrote in Aceh jungles. Hasan Tiro described clearly about the spirit of free Aceh movement and Aceh as an independent nation ([Tiro, 1968](#)), the flag, and other symbols ([Tiro, 1984](#)).

From the ground, the findings show that more than 67% of GAM activists, ex-combatants, and GAM supporters living in Aceh, believe that the MOU is the best achievement to realize Hasan Tiro's ideals. The MOU is a golden strategy to achieve the aspirations of the Acehese so that they must be loyal to this strategy of struggle because in the MOU there are struggle instruments, namely recognition of Aceh as a nation, Aceh flag and hymn, Wali Nanggroe and local political parties as instruments democracy. Meanwhile, GAM supporters who live in foreign countries, but not the GAM elite, saw this pessimistically. When asked about the many violations committed by the Government of Indonesia against the MOU, GAM activists stated that they would continue to evaluate and invite the international community, especially the Crisis Management Initiative to monitor it. However, insofar as it does not concern the MOU points which include struggle instruments, they can still be patient. From that, it can be understood that the MOU has become a new GAM's document of struggle, which contains instruments of struggle to realize the ideals of the Acehese in a democratic and peaceful manner.

The GAM's Way To Run MOU Helsinki

Based on the MOU and LoGA in 2006, Aceh's government which was politically controlled by local parties supported by GAM supporters had the extensive authority to arrange qanun on various matters related to Aceh's privilege in accordance with local aspirations. The formation of the qanun by the local parliament (DPRA) and the Aceh government does not entirely succeed as expected, as it often collides with the central government which has the authority to ratify the local regulations. The qanun dispute cases about the Wali Nanggroe institution (WNI) and Aceh flag and emblem are an example of never-ending differences in interests and interpretations on MOU.

The DPRA believes that what has been agreed upon in the Helsinki MOU is something that can be carried out as long as it is in the authority of the Aceh government and has been regulated in qanun. Endorsement and supervision from the central government of qanun whose material has been agreed upon in the MOU do not mean that it can be canceled. For example, qanun on the Wali Nanggroe Institution or *Lembaga Wali Nanggroe*, although the central government objected and did not approve the 21 material points contained in the qanun, the DPRA continued to ratify it, and together the Aceh Government continued to implement the WNI, starting from choosing a Wali Nanggroe, inaugurate it, and build the palace for the center of its activities, along with institutions under the auspices of a Wali Nanggroe. The WNI budget is also allocated in the Aceh regional budget. Everything works without interference from the central government.

The same thing also happened with Qanun No. 3 of 2013 regarding the Aceh flag which until today has not finished its discussion with the central government. However, there are still many people who acknowledge it in Aceh Besar, Pidie, Bireun, and Sabang. Indeed, in Banda Aceh, there was no single Aceh flag flying, even at the DPRA Office, but in

remote areas of Aceh, there were still found in places. This symptom is exactly the same as the strategy of no local party billboards, especially the Aceh Party whose colours are very similar to the GAM flag in Banda Aceh, but, in other Aceh, regions will be found easily. From interviews with local party activists, especially Aceh Party (AP), it can be revealed that the Aceh flag, which resembles the GAM and AP flags, may be cleared from the Banda Aceh area, but the Aceh flag will 'fly high in the hearts of the Acehnese'. This last phrase is a profound expression of the love of the people of Aceh for the symbol of the nation's flag and will be hoisted in its own way, for example by painting houses or shops, or a patrol post with the colour of Aceh's flag. This is everywhere in the Aceh region from Sabang to East Aceh.

From the findings, it can be interpreted that some qanuns related to Aceh's distinctiveness have strong support in the community, and qanun is an attempt to institutionalize historically sociological symbols and norms to become formal and institutionalized. With the authority to form qanun, the DPRA has strong reasons to institutionalize Aceh's sociological norms and symbols into qanun in broader fields, as well as the law of *shari'ah* (Islamic law), *jinayah* (Islamic criminal law) and *muamalah* (Islamic private law).

CONCLUSION

The peace will continue after the peace agreement because many Acehnese leaders who in fact are former GAM leaders believe that the MOU can bring Aceh to a self-government system through a peaceful and democratic process. In other words, the peace still continues in tandem with the continuity of ideological movement in Aceh. In this context, peace in Aceh will still present although the central government has violated MOU in many points, but not violated the instruments of political struggle for self-government such as the local party system, Wali Nanggroe institution, Aceh flag, and emblem.

To achieve self-government through the MOU as a document of struggle that they should be loyal to it, the Aceh government compiled, stipulated and implemented various qanuns, especially those relating to the specificity of Aceh because it received strong support from almost all regions of Aceh, with or without the approval of the central government. In terms of political struggle, people's support is more important and powerful than the central government's approval or legitimacy.

LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

This research observes relatively senior GAM activists who involved in a political movement before and after Helsinki peace agreement 2005, so how strong GAM ideology in Aceh younger generation especially millennials, and to find out the continuity of political movement's energy in Aceh are able to hold back so that there are no more open conflicts over violations of the MOU carried out by Jakarta, further research is needed on this matter.

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AUTHORS CONTRIBUTION

The first author (corresponding), Dr. Takdir Ali Mukti, as Head of Research Team in Aceh, prepares materials from the beginning, drafting article and structuring framework analysis. The second author, Professor Dr. Tulus Warsito, as a research supervisor contributes to political ideology perspectives in regional movements. Third author, Sidiq Ahmadi, MA, as a research team, subscribes to the Islamic political perspective in GAM ideology. Fourth author, Professor Dr. Bambang Cipto, as co-research supervisor, gives perspective on political transformation from revolutionary to the democratic movement of GAM in post-Helsinki agreement. Fifth author, Husni Amriyanto Putro, as a research team, contributes to the principles of Tiro's teaching as ideology.

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